Detection and Prevention of Wormhole Attack in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks Using Trust Tunneling

Abstract

Wireless networks are susceptible to multiple attacks, including an attack known as the wormhole attack. The wormhole attack is actually strong, and preventing the attack has proven to be actually sensitive. A strategic placement of the wormhole can perform in a significant breakdown in communication across a wireless network. In similar attacks two or another malicious colluding nodes produce an advanced- situation virtual tunnel in the network, which is placed to transport packets between the tunnel endpoints. These tunnels emulate shorter links in the network and so act as advantage to unknowing network nodes which by default seek low-lying routes. This work present a novel trust-based trick for connecting and separating nodes that produce a wormhole in the network without engaging any cryptographic measure. With the support of extended simulations, we substantiate that our device functions effectively in the sight of malicious colluding nodes and doesn't assess any inessential stipulations upon the network joint and assignment aspect.